d. tend to knock Italy out of the war.
 
e. threaten southern France and Italy.
 
        For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff should, as an
 
alternative or compromise, consider further operations in the
 
Western Mediterranean. They should strongly maintain, however,
 
that such operations are of an emergency nature, primarily in
 
support of Russia and that the major effort against Germany must
 
 remain SICKLE from now on and ROUNDUP in 1944. As between
 
SARDINIA and ITALY as objectives, SARDINIA would detract less
 
from the essential concentration of our resources in the United Kingdom.
 
 
    6. The British will continue to depreciate the importance of
 
the effort against Japan and the necessity for support of China.
 
They will argue that ANAKIM is impracticable in 1943 and will
 
probably present unsatisfactory alternatives. The United States
 
cannot do ANAKIM alone. A strong position should be taken as
 
 regards the Pacific and ANAKIM- namely, that if ANAKIM should
 
 be abandoned the United States must expand and intensify its opera-
 
tions in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which
 
Japan would gain by Allied failure adequately to support China.
 
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
 
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
 
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