d. While purporting to support Russia it can hardly fail
 
to arouse Russian suspicions as to the future of the
 
Dardanelles. It should be noted that because of the advent
 
of air power, supplemented by the submarine, British posses-
 
sion of the Dodecanese with the continuance of the control
 
they have consistently exercised over Greece, would serve to
 
bar the transit of the Straits by Russia substantially as
 
effectively as if the British held the shores of the Straits
 
themselves.
 
      e. It will be increasingly difficult to maintain popular acceptance
 
 of such action in the United States -- particularly in view of the continuing
 
 threat in the Pacific.
 
     f. It assumes an early and complete accomplishment of
 
HUSKY. This assumption seems less likely of realization than
 
the contrary one that this operation will be long drawn-out
 
and costly.
 
         Should the British insist on operations to the east of Sicily,
 
 the United States should inform them (1) that they will have to
 
 rely entirely on British resources, and (2) that to the extent such 
 
employment of resources detracts from the effectiveness of operations 
 
directly against Germany, the United States may be forced to increase 
 
its commitments in the Pacific.
   5. We are firmly of the opinion that sound basic strategy for
 
conducting the war in Europe requires that the major effort
 
against Germany be made from the United Kingdom by SICKLE now and
 
by ROUNDUP in 1944. We realize however that there is some force in 
 
the arguments that  post-HUSKY operations in the western
 
Mediterranean will--
 
 
a. maintain the momentum of HUSKY.
 
b. employ resources available there, which cannot be transferred to the
 
    United Kingdom this year.
 
c. furnish support to Russia.