S E C R E T ENCLOSURE "A" The war aims of the United States and British coincide in respect to the basic objectives of: (a) the imposition upon the Axis nations of a defeat that will render them militarily impotent; and (b) in principle, the defeat of Germany as of first priority. It is the general nature of the latter objective, which is not susceptible of precise definition, that has given rise to some divergence of views. It is a divergence easily under- stood. It springs from such fundamental causes as the differ- ences in the geographical situation of the two nations vis-a-vis the several enemies, and in the marked contrast between the two nations in respect of their territorial structures and the bases of their power. The threat in the Pacific, the importance of the Mediter- ranean, do not appeal to them with the same force. To the U. S. the former appears of such a nature and imminence that they view with greater concern than the British an indefinite delay in meeting its challenge. Operations in the Mediterranean, on the other hand, are viewed by the U.S. solely from the military viewpoint of wherein they contribute to winning the war. By the British, restored control of the Mediterranean is regarded as an objective of national policy essential to the maintenance of their present Imperial power, whereas they are confident that the defeat of Japan, no matter how long delayed, nor how completely accomplished by the United States, will restore the British position in the Far East. In consequence, United States policy indicates adoption of those direct measures that promise the earliest possible de- feat of Germany. The British have hitherto regarded successful accomplishment of such measures as being militarily impracti- cable at present. Furthermore, the decline in their Imperial strength that would result from a heavy loss of British manpower renders them reluctant to undertake major costly operations of - 12 - |