S E C R E T doubtful success. Having a definitely secondary interest in the Pacific but feeling the political necessity of conducting immediate offensive operations, the British advocate measures that, from the strictly military point of view of the U.S., seem indirect and lacking decisive effect in terminating the war. It is difficult to assess the relative weight given by the British to the factor of military practicability of direct decisive operstions and to their political desire to improve their post-war position. Both factors have undoubtedly played a part. However, unless the British are actually convinced that Mediterranean operations are the best military strategy they must see definite advantages therein, to their post-war position as, regards Europe. It would seem that the defeat of the Axis in Europe, however accomplished would restore the pre-war British position in the Mediterranean. Her insistence that war be fought in that area would suggest that the British desire to substantially improve their pre-war position in the Mediterranean and consider that actual occupation of certain areas, will greatly tend to strengthen their case at the peace table. It is believed that the proposals that will be advanced by the British will include operations involving the occupation of one or more of the following objectives, viz: a. In the eastern Mediterranean - Crete, Dodecanese, Greece, Turkey. b. In the western Mediterranean - Sardinia, Corsica, Italy. Each of such proposals should be examined from, inter alia, the point of view not only of the extent to which it will further the prosecution of the war, but of the extent to which it will absorb available means to the detriment of: an intensification of the air effort from the U.K.; the prosecution of the war effort in the Pacific on the scale approved by ANFA; and the build-up of BOLERO. - 13 - DECLASSIFIED By Authority of JCS 927/495-1 By DBS Date APR 13 1973 |