S E C R E T
 
     (b) AS BETWEEN THESE TWO BASIC UNDERTAKINGS, AVAILABLE
RESOURCES WILL BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:
          (1)     FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AXIS IN EUROPE - ALL 
     RESOURCES OVER AND ABOVE THOSE ALLOCATED FOR USE AGAINST    JAPAN.
          (2)     FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN - RESOURCES ADEQUATE 
     TO INSURE THAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE ARE NOT PREJUDICED BY 
     THE NECESSITY TO DIVERT FORCES THEREFROM, IN ORDER TO 
     RELIEVE AN ADVERSE SITUATION ARISING FROM OPERATIONS 
     AGAINST JAPAN; THE EXTENT OF SUCH OPERATIONS, HOWEVER, 
     TO BE KEPT WITHIN LIMITS WHICH WILL NOT, IN THE OPINION 
     OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JEOPARDIZE THE ABILITY
     OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A FAVORABLE 
     OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEAT GERMANY DECISIVELY IN 1943.
The British would like to have this, stated:
"All available resources will be allocated to the offensive
in European - Mediterranean Theater, except the minimum
necessary to safely maintain the strategic defense against 
Japan in the Pacific and Burma."
      PRIORITY AS AMONG SPECIFIC OPERATIONS.
      (a)     WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED FOR USE
AGAINST JAPAN, THE OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE PACIFIC
AND THEIR RELATIVE PRIORITY  WILL BE DECIDED BY THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF.
     The British would like to have added:   "subject to the
limitation that in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, such operations will be in accord with the general
concept of maintaining the strategic defense in that area."
     (b) WITHIN THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THE EUROPEAN THEATER 
AND TO THE FAR EAST, THE PRIORITY OF MAJOR OPERATIONS IS 
ESTABLISHED IN THE ORDER.  TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE, ANAKIM, BOLERO.
This item the British would like to revise to read: -
TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE and further operations in the Mediter-
ranean at least on an equal basis with SICKLE, BOLERO,
ANAKIM.
 
     2. At this point our concern with probable British strategy 
reduces itself to the consideration of "Post-HUSKY" operations. 
They will undoubtedly propose and press for further operations 
in the Mediterranean, while maintaining that such operations will
 
 
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