S E C R E T
 
     PRIORITY GROUP 2.
 
     (d) MEET  REQUIREMENTS OF RUSSIAN PROTOCOL TO GREATEST EX-
TENT POSSIBLE WITHOUT PROHIBITIVE COST IN SHIPPING.
     (e) SUSTAIN CHINA BY THE GREATEST VOLUME OF SUPPLIES THAT
CAN BE GOT INT0 CHINA, WITHOUT PROHIBITIVE COST IN TRANSPORT.
     (f) OTHER FIRM COMMITMENTS, APPROVED FROM TIME TO TIME,
FOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY REASONS AS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONDUCT
OF THE WAR.
     While the British have not definitely accepted the idea
of establishing priority on the basis of strategic commit-
ments and strategic undertakings, it is believed they would 
consider Items (a), (b), (c) and (d) to be satisfactory.
Item (e) they would probably accept as a safe statement, 
while making mutual reservations as to how they would inter-
pret it. There are numerous indications that the British
conception of the importance of China in the war is dif-
ferent from ours. They have consistently depreciated such
importance and opposed our conception that China is of
vital importance in ultimately defeating Japan. The British
would probably approve of Item (f) provided it stated
affirmatively that such commitments must be approved by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. This of course, is the intention.
 
V. PROJECTED STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS
     Priority as between the Axis in. Europe and Japan
    (a) RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS WILL
BE ALLOCATED ON THE BASIS 0F THE APPR0VED OVER-ALL STRATEGY
OF CONDUCTING A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE AXIS IN
EUROPE, WHILE MAINTAINING AND EXTENDING UNREMITTING PRESSURE
AGAINST JAPAN.
     The British would change this to read "* * * * overall
strategy of conducting the major offensive against the Axis
in the European - Mediterranean Theater with maximum forces,
while maintaining the strategic defensive in other areas."
 
 
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