(2) A return to the Continent in the event of German
 
disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever
 
forces may be available at the time.
 
     (3) A full-scale assault against the Continent as early
 
as possible in 1944.
 
c.   That in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST'
 
     (1) The UNITED NATIONS conduct limited offensive opera-
 
tions in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the
 
initiative, and attain or'retain positions of readiness
 
for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to
 
keep CHINA in the war.
 
     (2) For these purposes, naval forces be increased to a
 
maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the
 
ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN and that, with due regard to 
 
the requirements of' the main effort against the EUROPEAN 
 
AXIS, air and ground forces be provided so as to facilitate
 
joint action and make optimum use of the increasing
 
strength of U. S. Naval Forces.
 
d.   That if RUSSIA is defeated in the EUROPEAN-AFRICAN area,
 
the basic strategic concept should be reviewed and modified 
 
to conform to our then existing capabilities. Based on these
 
capabilities, the UNITED NATIONS should then either:
 
          (1) Reverse their strategic concept and launch all-out 
operations without delay against JAPAN, while making UNITED
 
NATIONS positions in the EUROPEAN-AFRICAN. area secure, or
 
     (2) If GERMANY has been sufficiently weakened, continue
 
operations with a view to her ultimate defeat on the
 
Continent of EUROPE.
 
In either case the UNITED NATIONS air offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM should be 
 
continued.
 
     e. That participation of CHINA in the war be assured by 
 
continuing to furnish her supplies and air support to the
 
grestest extent practicable.
 
                               -3-