ENCL0SURE
 
                                CLARIFICATION OF CASABLANCA DECISIONS
 
       
      We have considered in detail Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 199,
 
in close consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff.
 
 
         1. In general, we do not understand why a clarification of the
 
Casablanca decisions is required. In our view, C.C.S. 155/1 is a
 
clear, carefully worded document, unanimously approved at
 
Casablanca by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and thereafter also
 
approved by the President and the Prime Minister. We feel that
 
if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff wish to amend C.C.S. 155/1 the
 
proposed amendments should have strict relation to the existing text.
 
 Alternatively, if merely interpretation or clarification
 
is required, we feel that it would be better to agree upon such
 
interpretation or clarification again in direct relation, para-
 
graph by paragraph, to the existing text than to try to reach
 
agreement about a fresh paper which cannot but introduce new
 
shades of meaning.
 
 
2. Clauses 5 and 6 of C.C S. 155/1, read in conjunction with
 
the words "with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear
 
 upon her by the United Nations" which appear at the end of
 
clause 3, make it abundantly clear that the agreed intention at
 
Casablanca was to limit the forces allocated for use against
 
Japan to those necessary for preventing Japan from creating a
 
situation so adverse to the United Nations that it would have to
 
be retrieved at the expense of operations against Germany. From
 
the information available to us it does not appear that such a
 
situation is imminent nor that the United Nations are in danger
 
of losing the initiative; and we therefore feel that no "extension"
 
of the pressure now being applied to Japan and visualised in
 
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