paragraph 6(c)(ii) of C.C.S. 155/1 is necessary or justifiable
 
at the expense of operations against Germany. Indeed, it is
 
 clear from paragraph 6(c) that any "extension" of pressure
 
against Japan was to be of a lower order of priority than
 
ANAKIM.
 
 
        3. With regard to the allocation of resources referred to in
 
paragraph III of C.C.S. 199, we are not clear as to exactly what
 
this paragraph is intended to convey. We feel that it might be
 
interpreted as establishing the right to unilateral modification
 
of agreed programmes and would like to know who will review the
 
scale and who will judge how the changing situation will affect
 
allocations.
 
 
     4. We feel that clauses 3 and 5 of C.C.S. 155/1 give a clearer and
 
simpler statement of the agreed strategy than that given in paragraph
 
 V(b) of C.C.S. 199 and that they should be adhered to.
 
 
      5. Paragraph VI(b) of C.C.S. 199 sets out a priority as among
 
specific operations. We are not quite happy about this paragraph
 
because we feel that whereas perhaps as regards the Pacific it is not 
 
binding enough, as regards the other theatres it is perhaps rather  too
 
 binding. For instance,  it is too early yet to say that after SICKLE should
 
 come ANAKIM. Then again, its wording rather rigidly excludes any
 
reference to the possibility, after HUSKY, of such action as that referred
 
 to in paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of C.C.S. 155/1. The position of BOLERO
 
 also needs further examination in relation to commitments in the Pacific. If our
 
policy is to be a strategic offensive against the Axis in Europe clearly BOLERO
 
 must not be starved as otherwise Cross Channel Operations in 1944 will
 
 again be impossible.