6. A general comment, which we thirdc to be fair , is that
 
C.C.S. 199 by implication would seem to give pride of place to
 
war in the Far East, whereas the clear decision at Casablanca was
 
that the decisive defeat of Germany must come first.
 
 
        7.  We feel, therefore, that there are many important points
 
of difference between C.C.S. 199 and C.C.S. 155/1. If it is felt
 
that a new version of C.C.S. 155/1 is required as distinct from
                               
possible amendments to or amplification of C.C. S 155/1 we con-
 
sider that it would be a hopeless task to try to arrive at this
 
new version by the interchange of telegrams. C.C.S. 155/1 was
 
tha fruit of many days of careful and earnest discussion in an
 
atmosphere in which the various points of view were disclosed
 
with perfect frankness and where the elucidation of any point
 
of view could be obtained immediately. We recommend therefore:
 
          a. That C.C.S. 155/1 should continue to be the accepted
 
paper that it has been ever since Casablanca.
 
        b. That if the U. S. Chiefs of Staff should wish to amend
 
that document, the proposed amendments should have strict
 
relation to the existing text and ample time should be given
 
for their consideration.
 
8. It is clear that any amendments which may be agreed between
 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to be referred to the
 
President and the Prime Minister for their approval.
 
 
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