S E C R E T b. Air Air operations in CHINA will require additional aircraft as shown in paragraph 19 a above. Air deployments to SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (2579 aircraft), January 1, 1944, have been made in accordance with requests for forces by the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC, to perform tasks assigned, exclusive of capture of RABAUL. It is entirely possible that attrition of Japanese aircraft during the preliminary phases of operations under way will permit the taking of RABAUL and completion of sub- sequent operations in NEW GUINEA, with the forces allocated. However, for planning purposes, and assmuing JAPAN has not been evicted from the CAROLINES, it is estimated that for operations to complete the capture of NEW GUINEA, including defense forces, 3048 aircraft will be required. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft as of January 1, 1944. There will be sufficient land-based aircraft available to CINCPAC for the operations in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES during 1944. c. Naval It is concluded that there are not sufficient naval forces to carry on a major operation in the central PACIFIC and a major operation in the SOUTH PACIFIC simultaneously during 1943-44. Preceding discussions of the naval requirements for individual operations make it apparent that consideration must be given to the sequence of assigned tasks. d. Logistics The logistical implications for supworting major opera- tions such as those in NEW GUINEA or the CAROLINES have not been assessed in this paper, among these implications would be the shipping required to support the additional ground, air, and naval forces moved to the theater. Furthermore, as the forces advance there will be increasing demands for cargo shipping due to the extension of the line of communications, such as from from RABAUL to NEW GUINEA. - 28 - |