S E C R E T
 
theater commanders to plsm, organize, and execute such 
operations. The necessity for such coordination will become 
increasingly apparent as the war progresses.
 
    29. A definite policy as to the timing of any bombing of-
fensive or bombing raid against JAPAN proper from bases in 
CHINA should be announced at once, because of the probability 
of a premature raid jeopardizing the success of the desired 
diversionary effect in connection with some other operation
at a later date, such as the MARSHALL ISLANDS operations.
Again the initiation of bomber raids against JAPAN proper from 
bases in CHINA before sufficient means to make a sustained 
bomber offensive are available may result in JAPAN making in-
tensified efforts to end Chinese resistance, such as an attack 
on KUNMING from HANOI.
 
               CONCLUSI0NS
    30. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the ob-
jectives in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-44 should be:
     a. Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
     b. Seizure of BURMA.
     c. Ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
     d. Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS
     e. Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAG0, 
               and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
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