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an already difficult civilian position, both in Germany and in occupied areas.
     5. The significance of the present transport shortage is difficult to evaluate on the basis of
present limited information. Thus far civilians have largely borne the impact of the new strains
induced by the Russian war. Coal shipments to Italy and Sweden have been reduced and shortages
of supplies for German war industries have been reported. The extent and the rate at which the
output of military equipment and their supply to the fighting fi'onts may be affected can not be
stated. The immediate seriousness of the situation can readily be exaggerated, but at the very
least, the shortage means that organizational and material resources, which are vitally needed in
uses that contribute more directly to military success, must be devoted to the alleviation of the
transport difficulties. It may be possible to measure the degree of strain more closely during the
coming winter, when pressure on the German transport system would, in any case, be expected to
increase.
 
F. THE PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN MORALE
 
     1. From 1933, and even before, German morale was prepared for the responsibilities and
hardships of offensive military action. The advent of the National Socialist regime was
accompanied by the institution of elaborate efforts to control and direct public opinion to this end.
     2. Nazi propaganda theorists have realized that during a modern total war efforts to
control public opinion work within narrow limits. The real underlying factors remain, as
elsewhere, the success, actual and prospective, of military operations and the hardships and
discomforts borne by the people.
     3. From the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 until June 1941 the strength of German morale
was unquestioned. This may be regarded essentially as a consequence of the great German
victories and, perhaps more important, the feeling that total victory was certain and within sight.