suggestions as to how it might be handled. Admittedly no 
 
easy solution is at hand.
 
     4. It is true enough that one of the chief aims of
 
Soviet policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the
 
maximum guarantees of Russia's "security" so that the Soviet 
 
Government can work out their own social and economic
 
experiment without danger of foreign intervention or war.
 
But this is by no means the chief motive which lies behind
 
M. Stalin's present demand for the recognition of his 1941
 
frontiers. We cannot therefore help feeling that the President 
 
is unduly optimistic in supposing that some other form of
 
security in lieu of the reoccupation of the Baltic States
 
will prove acceptable to M. Stalin. Since M. Stalin has
 
decided that the Soviet Union's security requires that the 
 
Baltic States should be in the Union, he will not be willing
 
to discuss the rights and wrongs of this decision.
 
      5.    M. Stalin's view undoubtedly is that having taken
 
this decision, he is merely asking us to assist him to
 
recover these territories at the Peace Settlement, if the 
 
need arises - ancient Russian territories which had been
 
regained by the Soviet Union before Hitler's attack on
 
Russia. As for the Atlantic Charter, he would argue that
 
the frontier which he wishes us to recognise in Finland was
 
one that was settled in due form by a treaty between the
 
Soviet and Finnish Governments, that the Baltic States
 
voted for inclusion in the Soviet Union by means of
 
plebiscites, thus fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic
 
Charter, and that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were
 
handed back to Russia by Roumania in accordance with the 
 
provisions of a treaty concluded between the Soviet and
 
Roumanian Governments. Moreover, M. Stalin signed the
 
Atlantic.....