Atlantic Charter on the assumption that it only became
 
effective for the Soviet Union on the basis of the frontiers
 
of 1941.
 
       6. It is true that we have suggested two alternative
 
proposals to the President based on Russia's security needs,
 
but we doubt whether they would satisfy M. Stalin even if
 
they could be shown to have the support of the United States
 
of America and were accepted as a contribution towards sincere
 
co-operation between our three countries at the peacemaking
 
and after the war. But these alternative proposals contained
 
concrete offers, whereas the President would appear to be of
 
the opinion that it is premature to attempt a detailed treatment of the problem.
 
     7. As to the procedure which should now be followed,
 
clearly it would be to the common advantage if conversations
 
between President Roosevelt and M. Stalin were to result in
 
agreement being reached between all three powers. The way
 
would then be open for us to sign a treaty with M. Stalin.
 
We think, however, that we should put to President Roosevelt
 
some of the difficulties which we see in this procedure.
 
As it is with His Majesty's Government and not with the
 
United States Government that M. Stalin wishes to conclude
 
a treaty and as it is from His Majesty's Government that he
 
wishes to obtain recognition of his territorial claim, it
 
would seem inappropriate to him that we should not be a
 
party to these exchanges. We fear that if the President
 
were to argue this matter alone with M. Stalin, the latter
 
might suspect that we had agreed to this procedure in order 
 
that the United States Government might bring pressure to
 
bear upon him, and he might resent it accordingly. Moreover,
 
as we have not ourselves expressed any opinion to M. Stalin
 
on...