UNITED STATES FLEET HEAGQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. March 5, 1942 Memorandum for the President: 1. The delineation of general areas of responsibility for operations in the Pacific is now taking place, in which it appears that we - the U.S. - will take full charge of all operations con- ducted eastward of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra. 2. You have expressed the view - concurred in by all of your chief military advisers - that we should determine on a very few lines of military endeavor and concentrate our efforts on those lines. It is to be recognized that the very few lines of U.S military effort may require to be shifted in accordance with developments but the total number should be kept at a very few. 3. Consideration of what war activities we (U.S.) should undertake in the Pacific requires to be premised on some examination of our (U.S.) relationship with respect to world-wide war activities - the Pacific being one part of the larger whole. 4. Other than in the Pacific our principal allies - Great Britain and Russia - are already committed to certain lines of military effort, to which our (U.S.) chief contribution in the case of Russia will continue to be munitions in general. 5. As to Britain's lines of military effort: (a) it is apparent that we (U.S.) must enable the British to hold the citadel and arsenal of Britain itself by means of the supply of munitions, raw materials and food - and to some extent by troops, when they will release British troops to other British military areas. (b) the middle East is a line of British military effort which they - and we - cannot afford to let go. This effort should continue to receive our (U.S.) munitions. (c) the India-Burma-China line of British military effort is now demanding immediate attention on their part - and will absorb its proportion of our (U.S.) munitions - in addition to the munitions which we are committed to furnish to China. |