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                UNITED STATES FLEET   
HEAGQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
        NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.                                                                   
                                     
 
                                         March 5, 1942
 
Memorandum for the President:
 
         1.      The delineation of general areas of responsibility for 
operations in the Pacific is now taking place, in which it appears 
that we - the U.S. - will take full charge of all operations con-
ducted eastward of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.
 
         2.      You have expressed the view - concurred in by all of your 
chief military advisers - that we should determine on a very few lines 
of military endeavor and concentrate our efforts on those lines. It 
is to be recognized that the very few lines of U.S military effort 
may require to be shifted in accordance with developments but the 
total number should be kept at a very few.
 
         3.      Consideration of what war activities we (U.S.) should 
undertake in the Pacific requires to be premised on some examination 
of our (U.S.) relationship with respect to world-wide war activities - 
the Pacific being one part of the larger whole.
 
         4.      Other than in the Pacific our principal allies - Great 
Britain and Russia - are already committed to certain lines of 
military effort, to which our (U.S.) chief contribution in the case 
of Russia will continue to be munitions in general.
 
        5.       As to Britain's lines of military effort:
 
                (a) it is apparent that we (U.S.) must enable the British 
        to hold the citadel and arsenal of Britain itself by means of 
        the supply of munitions, raw materials and food - and to some 
        extent by troops, when they will release British troops to 
        other British military areas.
 
                 (b) the middle East is a line of British military effort 
        which they - and we - cannot afford to let go. This effort 
        should continue to receive our (U.S.) munitions.
 
               (c) the India-Burma-China line of British military effort 
        is now demanding immediate attention on their part - and will 
        absorb its proportion of our (U.S.) munitions - in addition to 
        the munitions which we are committed to furnish to China.
 
 
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