UNITED STATES FLEET
HEAGQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
March 5, 1942
Memorandum for the President:
1. The delineation of general areas of responsibility for
operations in the Pacific is now taking place, in which it appears
that we - the U.S. - will take full charge of all operations con-
ducted eastward of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.
2. You have expressed the view - concurred in by all of your
chief military advisers - that we should determine on a very few lines
of military endeavor and concentrate our efforts on those lines. It
is to be recognized that the very few lines of U.S military effort
may require to be shifted in accordance with developments but the
total number should be kept at a very few.
3. Consideration of what war activities we (U.S.) should
undertake in the Pacific requires to be premised on some examination
of our (U.S.) relationship with respect to world-wide war activities -
the Pacific being one part of the larger whole.
4. Other than in the Pacific our principal allies - Great
Britain and Russia - are already committed to certain lines of
military effort, to which our (U.S.) chief contribution in the case
of Russia will continue to be munitions in general.
5. As to Britain's lines of military effort:
(a) it is apparent that we (U.S.) must enable the British
to hold the citadel and arsenal of Britain itself by means of
the supply of munitions, raw materials and food - and to some
extent by troops, when they will release British troops to
other British military areas.
(b) the middle East is a line of British military effort
which they - and we - cannot afford to let go. This effort
should continue to receive our (U.S.) munitions.
(c) the India-Burma-China line of British military effort
is now demanding immediate attention on their part - and will
absorb its proportion of our (U.S.) munitions - in addition to
the munitions which we are committed to furnish to China.