- 2 -
 
Memorandum for the President
                                   March 5, 1942
 
         6.      The chief sources of munitions for the United Nations 
are Britain, the U.S. end, to some degree, Russia. The chief sources 
of man-power for the United Nations are China, Russia, the U.S., and 
to less degree, the British Commonwealth. The only mobile factors 
are those available to Britain and to the U.S., because of their use 
of sea power - navies and shipping.
 
         7.      Australia- and New Zealand - are "white men's countries" 
which it is essential that we shall not allow to be overrun by Japan -
because of the repercussion among the non-white races of the world.
 
         8.      Reverting to the premise of paragraph 2 - a very few 
lines of military endeavor - the general area that needs immediate 
attention - and is in our (U.S.) sphere of responsibility - is 
Australasia, which term is intended to include the Australian conti-
nent, its approaches from the northwest - modified ABDA area- and 
its approaches from the northeast and east - ANZAC area. These 
approaches require to be actively used - continuously - to hamper the 
enemy advance and/or consolidation of his advance bases.
 
         9.      Our primary concern in the Pacific is to hold Hawaii and 
its approaches (via Midway) from the westward and to maintain its 
communications with the West Coast. Oil next care in the Pacific is 
to preserve Australasia (par. 8 above) which requires that its com-
munications be maintained - via eastward of Samoa, Fiji and south-
ward of New Caledonia.
 
         lO.     We have now - or will soon have - "strong points" at
Samoa, Suva (Fiji) and, New Caledonia (also a defended fueling base
at Bora Bora, Society Islands). A naval operating base is shortly 
to be set up in Tongatabu (Tonga Islands) to service our naval forces 
operating in the South Pacific. Efate (New Hebrides) stud Funafuti 
(Ellice Islands) are projected additional "strong points".
 
       ll.      When the foregoing 6 "strong points" are made reasonably 
secure, we shall not only be able to cover the line of communications - 
to Australia (and New Zealand) but- given the naval forces, air units,
and amphibious troops- we cau drive northwest from the New Hebrides
into the Solomons and the Bisrmarck Archipelago after the same fashion 
of step-by-step advances that the Japanese used in the South China 
Sea. Such a line of operations will be offensive rather than 
passive - and will draw Japanese forces there to oppose it, thus 
relieving pressure, elsewhere, whether in Hawaii, ABDA area, Alaska,
 or even India.