b. - Cross channel movement and seizure of beachhead 
                    between Le Havre and Boulogne.
               c. - Consolidation of beachhead and beginning of
                                   further operations.
 
                 4. An added feature of this plan is that, during the preparatory period it provides
means to act promptly under either of the following eventualities:
                           (a) If the imminence of Russian collapse requires desperate action, a sacrifice
     attack could be made.
                            (b) If German forces are almost completely absorbed on the
     Russian front, a prompt movement to the continent might be undertaken with much
     smaller forces than would otherwise be
     justified.
 
                              Included, later in this paper, is an outlined plan for an attack about September
15, 1942.
 
                       5. Limitations as to time and as to strength of attack are imposed upon both plans
by the shortage of shipping, and, secondarily, by the difficulty in the production of landing craft.
Further limitations are imposed by the necessity for executing certain commitments and
requirements, already of record, which absorb a certain amount of shipping. These include:
 
          2 Divisions to Australia
          1 Division to New Zealand
          Sufficient shipping to England to transport 4O,000
               troops and equipment to the Middle East. 
          Continuance of material aid to Russia and to others
               of the United Nations.
 
          PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE
     6.  Assumptions.
 
          a.    That the line, Alaska- Hawaii- Australia will be held and Pacific garrisions
increased from a present approximate strength of 175,000 to an approximate strength of 300,000.