The shipping situation is such that if our present 
commitments are carried out, including the reinforcement of
 overseas garrisons to bring them to a safe level, no troops can be
dispatched to Syria until about September 1, 1942. At that time
 silipping for about 82,000 men will become available. On accoun
t of the long turn around, it is estimated that it will take until
July 1943 to set down in Syria a force of ten or eleven divisions.
 
     The turn-around for shipping to the head of the Persian Gulf
 or Suez is five months, while to Enland it is less than two and 
one-half Months. In other words, for every division sent to the
Middle East and supported in that area, over two divisions can
 be sent to England and support and in that area.
 
     Due to the limits imposed by the size of the air forces available
 and our present commitments, it will be impossible to set up a large
 offensive Air Force in more than one theater during 1942. The
 pressure of events has forced us to disperse our Air Forces to such
 an extent that we now, at best, have only a bare minimum of defensive
 air strength in any theater. This is one of the reasons why the enemy
 still retains the initiative both in Europe and in Asia.
 
      Now under consideration is a plan to send one group of medium
 bombardment, two groups of light bombardment and two groups
 of pursuit aviation to the Middle East as assistance to the British in
 holding that area. These would have to come from air force intended 
for the British Isles or some other area.
 
      The present situation should not blind us to the principle of 
concentration of force and our strategic conception must look toward
 the early establishment of an air force strong enough to achieve 
decisive results in some one theater.
 
b. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN LYBIA.
   --------------------------------------------  
 
        The considerations outlined above relative to operations in SYRIA
 would also hold true in the LYBIAN Theater. The forces we could
 place in this theater and the tenth of our lines of communication, would
 be approximately the same as for SYRIA. The sole advantage that
this Theater has over SYRIA is that it might better our general strategic
 position by successful offensive action. This might occur as follows:
                   
      (1) Successful offensive operations as they progress would
            place us in a progressively more favorable position for
             long range bombing of targets in Europe.
 
       (2) Elimination of Axis forces in North Africa would
            deny control of the Mediterranean to the Axis.
 
C. USE OF U.S. TROOPS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA
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 a U.S.Force in Northwest Africa, once established, would