WAR DEPARTMENT
                                      CLASSIFlED MESSAGE CENTER                                       
 
 
From : Australia
     To: IMMEDIATE GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL
 
NR 56 April First
 
     In order to relieve the blockade pressure in at endeavor to permit passage of supplies from
Cebu to Corregidor I prepared prior to my departure delayed plans for an air attack of B rpt baker
one leven bombers from here to Minciano and thence to Mission destination. I am now preparing its
prompt execution, reurad nine six six. This effort is a critical one due to the lack of Air Force
available here. I have only twelve serviceable B one sevens, many of which are approaching
exhustion. I believe there is a fair hope for blockade runners from the U.S. to reach destination if they
approach by the route north of Luzon. Their speed will give them an excellent chance to get through
as the enemy is concentrating his patrols on the routes from Visayan waters and the entrance to
Manila Bay is not yet mined by the enemy. I believe also that the supplies on Batan will last beyond
the date of April 15th. I am in addition diverting submarines sufficient for the purpose to ferry food
supplies from the Southern Phillippine islands to Corregidor. The supply should be ample for
mantenance for an indefinite time. When I left on March 11th it was my estimate that serious shortage
would not develop at the earliest before May 1st., allowing sufficient time for arrival of blockade
runners from the U.S. It is of course possible that with my departure the rigor of application of
conservation may have relaxed.
 
     I am utterly opposed, under any circumstances or conditions to the ultimate capitulation of
this command as visulaized in General Wainwrights radio. If it is to be destroyed it should be upon
the actual field of battle taking full toll from the enemy. To this end I had long ago prepared a
comprehensible plan to endeavor to cut a way out if food or ammunition failed. This plan
contempalted an ostentaticus artillary preparation on the left by the first Corps as a feint artillary
preparation on the left by the first Corps as a feint and sudden surprise attack on the right by the
second Corps. This movement to be made in conjunction with the full tank strength and with the
maximum artillery concentration with heavy guns run foward under cover of darkness the night before
so that their fire would reach and cover an infantry advance as far as possible toward the Dinaluphan
dash Giongape