WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
 
Dinnalupahan dash Olongapo Road; this road to be seized and the Second Corps to thrust with all
speed and force due West taking the enemys Subic rpt Subic Bay portions in reverse
simultaneously with a frontal attack by the First Corps. If sucessful, the supplies seized at this
base might well rectify the situation. This would permit them to operate in Central Luzon where
food supplies could be obtained and where they could still protect Bataan and the Northern
appraoches to Corregidor. If the movement is not sucessful and our forces defeated many
increments thereof after inflicting important losses upon the enemy could escape through the
Zambales Mountains and continue guerilla warfare in conjuction with forces now operating in the
north. Simultaneously aggressive action within their capabilities would be launched by both the
Visayan fore and the Mindanao Force. I had not informed General Wainwright of this plan as I
feared it might tend to shake his morale and determination. I shall however, in view of his radio to
you, I inform himthereof in the near future. I would be very glad if you believe it advisable to
attempt myself to rejoin this command temporily and take charge of this movement. The pressure 
on this situation could be immeasureably relieved if a naval task force with its own air protection
could make some kind of threat in that general direction. The long series of disaters in the
Pacid=fic Theatre can be traced basically to one cause; the unopposed control of the sea lanes by
the Japanese. Until this condition is remedied these disasters will continue. Line of
communications control is fundamental either on land or sea. Enemy control has been complete
up to the present time. I knoiw how desparately you are pressed for reinforcements and supplies
in all areas and I do not repeat not intendto harass you by requisitions that cannot be
accomplished. It would however tend to relieve the dangers here if without delay a small force of
say nine B repeat Baker one seven bombers could immediately made available instead awaiting the
normal flow as now anticipated. Please inform me as soon as possible of any modifications you
may desire in the plan I have outlined. Several days ago I informed General Wainwright about the
contemplated air attack but will not rpt not convey further instruction until I hear from you. 
     I ahve complete and instantenous communication with General Wainwright and all the
forces in the Phillipine Islands and I believe that greater rapidity of action and more
completecoordination of command can be achieved if he routes his communications except for
routine administration matters through my head quaters rather than direct to the war department
and essential in his operations reports for he not only reports