-5- would be fought to the end, but how would it benefit those who lived after it? He was sure that common sense would triumph, and that the two peoples racially akin with the finest qualities would not commit suicide. Lord Lothian stated that England had had no experience of Bolshevism, there had only been two Communist M. Ps. since the War. Regarding Spain, most Englishmen thought that Spain had best be left to work out its own salvation, and would find means eventually of establishing a Government characteristic of the Spanish nation, which would be neither a government of Generals nor Communist, but something in between. Anglo-German friction on this subject would disappear. Regarding the colonial question, this was inseparably mixed up with economic questions. Territorial exchange was an extremely difficult matter. But 1% was not right to assume that England took the view that Germany should have no colonies, colonial adjustment, though not on a large scale, was not impossible. There were other questions, particularly Eastern Europe. Lord Lothian enlarged on nationality as basic factor in the rodern world, and how recognition of the right of each to existence was the corrective of the British Commonwealth, and had made possible the new relationship between U.S.A. and the South American States. Was not the establishment of a similar rdlationship between Germany and Eastern European States the key to the solution of Germany's European problems? If confidence could be created in Germany's will and power to respect the integrity of Eastern nations of Europe it would make an immense difference in England. Moreover was not recognition of nationality a basic principle of National Socialism? Germany's role in this sphere was clear. (The British Foreign Minister, proceeded Lothian, in his speech at Leamington had defined British Foreign Policy in an authorised statement. This was the British constitution to clearing up the situation regarding sphere of vital interest. Britain had no primary interests in Eastern Europe. |