-5-                             
 
 
having got back the Corridor.
 
 
Such a military policy is not only advisable for Hitler
from a purely military point of view but also in respect to
the military situation here, in London. There are still great
hesitations in the British policy and appeasement is not yet
dead. If Hitler follows a policy as explained above he might
be able at each turning point of this policy to find some
support here in England and in France which might lead to a
postponemont again and again of any really decisive and outspoken 
action on the part of Poland's western allies.
 
 
         I suppose that Hitler's personal optimism as regards the
Polish question is based upon such and similar calculations.
 
 
So far the Army will agree with him. They will disagree
fully with him of course as soon as they come to the conclusion
that in spite of initial military and diplomatic successes
Germany might be forced to fight a long war as to the end of
which they have not the slightest doubt. I come to the 
conclusion that the Genrals are pondering these things and are, 
therefore wavering and hesitating, thus I am afraid in spite 
of the many optimistic informations to the contrary they will
not move in time to prevent definitely a war. People who waver
and have not made up their minds firmly will never take the
right decision at the most opportune moment. That is the point
upon which my pessimism is really based, as much as I would wish
that the Corridor question could be solved in the only possible
natural way for the interests of Germany I cannot accept the
 
 
                                                           method