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Spain, largely created by Germany herself, might well overnight reasult
in embroiling the whole of Europe, and German policy could be either
tremendously furthered or disasterously damaged.  Indeed, it has just
been confidentially learned that Hitler already feels remorse - more on
tactical than moral grounds - at having succumbed to the blandishments
of Ciano who
persuaded him to join Italy in recognizing Franco.
 
 
Second, Germany's progress depends largely on whether or not she is
able to maintain at least neutral relations with England.
 
 
Third, the economic and financial situation in Germany is a potential
danger to the pursuit of her foreign policy depending on whether or not
external
political progress can be made to such a rapid extent that the
intricate economic problems now facing Germany will thereby be largely
solved as a natural sequence.  In this respect, the constant pressing
of foreign poicy may at least be understood.  
 
 
Fourth, there is always the possibility of a dictatorship getting out
of hand in that the necessarily rapid developments on which it thrives
internally cannot always be absorbed fast enough externally. In a
dictatorahip with as broad a foreign policy as Germany's this ia
particularly true. However, one may understand Germany's power and
prestige pace better if it is realized that time plays an important
role in her rearmament; most of Germany's so-called adver-