Germany and most likely to be affected by a potentially dangerous 
      situation. In the event of an attack on Poland or Rumania there 
      would be good reasons on the merits of the case for trying to 
      secure some measure of Soviet participation. We believe that 
      even the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet would be to the 
      advantage of these two countries in case of war and that they 
      might indeed be grateful in an emergency to have at their disposal 
      such war material as the Soviet industry would be in a position 
      to furnish. We are disposed in the first place to ascertain the 
      views of the Soviet Government as to their likely attitude to 
      this market. It is important not to reinforce their tendency 
      towards isolation and we propose to consider in due course how 
      best to retain their close interest which is after all to their 
      own general advantage.
 
      
 
 
It is essential of course that the present approach to the 
      Polish and Rumanian Governments should be kept secret as well 
      as any negotiations that may follow it. Once however agreement 
      has been secured it would be necessary for constitutional reasons 
      that some statement should be made in Parliament. His Majesty's 
      Government would at any rate have to state in public the assurances 
      which they had given to the Polish and Rumanian Governments. 
      It is possible that,