2
the total production of all types for the German Air Force
the above output amounts to about 7,500 first line types during
the year. With such an output of first line types it would be
possible to raise the first line strength to the 4,500 mentioned
in paragraph 2, to re-equip 50% of the existing first line and
to raise the reserve to about 100% modern types as well as meeting
normal wastage requirements.
4. British policy vis-a-vis the German air threat
The policy adopted by the British Government to meet the situation
brought about by the expansion of German and other air armaments
was explained to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State
for Air on 10th November, 1938. The Secretary of State described
our objective as an Air Force adequate for our necessities: our
necessities, as previously defined by the Prime Minister, being
the protection of the United Kingdom, preservation of the trade
routes, defense of British territories overseas, and co-operation
in the defense of the territories of our Allies in case of war.
The Secretary of State added that the policy aimed at producing
a sound and balanced force for war, adequate for our strategic
necessities and with the depth behind it to enable it to sustain
its efforts should we be attacked.
5. It is clear from this definition that the British Government
do not regard parity of numbers of first line aircraft as a satisfactory
test of what is adequate for a sound air defense. The test of
parity in first line has, in fact, no strategic basis, a formidable
first line, lacking depth, is no more than a facade which will
melt and disappear under conditions of war wastage. Again, the
strength of the aircraft required in the different categories
will vary widely from one
* A war wastage rate of 50% per month can be regarded as normal