2 the total production of all types for the German Air Force the above output amounts to about 7,500 first line types during the year. With such an output of first line types it would be possible to raise the first line strength to the 4,500 mentioned in paragraph 2, to re-equip 50% of the existing first line and to raise the reserve to about 100% modern types as well as meeting normal wastage requirements. 4. British policy vis-a-vis the German air threat The policy adopted by the British Government to meet the situation brought about by the expansion of German and other air armaments was explained to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Air on 10th November, 1938. The Secretary of State described our objective as an Air Force adequate for our necessities: our necessities, as previously defined by the Prime Minister, being the protection of the United Kingdom, preservation of the trade routes, defense of British territories overseas, and co-operation in the defense of the territories of our Allies in case of war. The Secretary of State added that the policy aimed at producing a sound and balanced force for war, adequate for our strategic necessities and with the depth behind it to enable it to sustain its efforts should we be attacked. 5. It is clear from this definition that the British Government do not regard parity of numbers of first line aircraft as a satisfactory test of what is adequate for a sound air defense. The test of parity in first line has, in fact, no strategic basis, a formidable first line, lacking depth, is no more than a facade which will melt and disappear under conditions of war wastage. Again, the strength of the aircraft required in the different categories will vary widely from one * A war wastage rate of 50% per month can be regarded as normal |