-3 -                            
 
      Other matters that are before the European Advisory Commission 
      I hope I will have an opportunity to discuss with you after your 
      meeting at ARGONAUT. Harry Hopkins told me, while in London, 
      that you were arranging for my meeting you before your return 
                      to the United States.                 
 
                                                            
 
 
Control machinery was worked out within the Commission with 
      the understanding that in the first phase of occupation after 
      unconditional surrender there would be military control in Germany. 
      It was understood that the commanding general of each of the 
      three forces would both serve as a member of the Control Council 
      and be in command of his own zone with, of course, authority 
      to delegate such powers as he saw fit. If the French, who have 
      been admitted to the European Commission, are to sign the Unconditional 
      Surrender Instrument and be admitted to the Control Council and 
      be given a zone of occupation, you would then have quadripartite 
      instead of tripartite participation. The British have conceded 
      this; neither the Russian representative nor myself has as yet 
    been authorized to state a position on the French propos
 
                                                            
 
 
The theory on which we have proceeded is that broad overall 
      policies in matters affecting Germany as a whole would be arrived 
      at by agreement between the participating Powers, either in the 
      form of general orders or directives, and that the residue of 
      powers would remain with the commanders in the zones. These general 
      authorities affecting Geeany as a whole would be agreed between 
      the Governments in broad terms, leaving all detailing to the 
      Control Council. The necessity for governmental agreement is 
      due to the fact that neither the Russians nor the British are 
      willing to delegate political authority to generals in the field. 
      You can do this because you are not only the Chief of State but 
      also, under the Constitution, Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
      forces of the United States. Stalin might do so but does not 
      choose to do so. An illustration  %of this is the authority given 
      by him to Vyshinsky in supervising the execution of the armistice 
      terms in Rumania. This fact has also been made very clear to 
      me by Gousev in the European Advisory Commission.