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The converse of this is that agreements by the generals, even 
      in the Control Council, would be subject to interference by the 
      Governments. It is true, the generals could ask for governmental 
      agreement, but our experience in dealing with the Russians has 
      shown that it is easier to get agreement prior to occupation 
                      than after occupation.                
 
                                                            
 
 
If the position stated by the British and Russian Governments 
      in the European Advisory Commission is in any way a criterion 
      of the position of their respective Governments, they mean to 
      force the central German government agencies, after stripping 
      them of Nazi political leadership, to carry out their will in 
      Germany. The question of an orderly decentralization of political 
      Germany can come later. Both the Russian and British concept 
      is to prevent disorder and disease, for the protection of Allied 
      occupying forces, by making full use of German administrative 
      functionaries. This has nothing to do with a "hard" 
       or "soft" policy that may be adopted toward Germany. 
 
                                                            
 
 
The suggestion in the overall Civil Affairs Directive (revised 
      JCS 1067), which has just been sent to me, runs counter to this 
      concept, and, as far as I can understand it, sets up an economic 
      control within each of the three or four separate military zones 
      with-out taking account of the existing nationalized transport 
      system and prior provision for common utilization of the food 
      surpluses, most of which will be in the Russian zone, and of 
      coal, all of which will be in the British and Russian zones. 
      These are only examples of problems that must be faced
 
                                                            
 
 
There are two other considerations that I believe should not 
      be lost sight of. One, that contradictory basic regulations in 
      the separate zones are likely to lead to serious friction between 
      the allied forces of occupation and would encourage the Germans 
      to try to play one ally against another. Two, since we have insisted 
      in the Surrender Instrument that the signatory Powers are "acting 
      in the interests of the United Nations", we have taken on 
      a trustee obligation to other European United Nations which we 
      will fail to discharge