or any equivalent combination.
 
          The follow-up force will require additionally:
 
     45 LST 
     13 LCI 
     60 LCT
     16 AK
 
or any equivalent combination.
 
b. Availability.
 
          HUSKY requires shipping to lift eight assault divisions 
whereas this operation requires the lift of three and one half 
assault divisions. Therefore, assuming losses in HUSKY do not 
exceed 50%, there will be adequate shipping in the area for 
this operation. A small amount of replacement shipping be-
comes available meanwhile.
 
          The shipping combination shown above is one based on 
craft to be in place for HUSKY.
 
           Due to the necessfty for repairing landing craft after 
HUSKY, and for amphibious training and rehearsal, it is con-
sidered that the earliest-possible target date for this opera-
tion is 10 weeks subsequent to the initiation of HUSKY.
 
15. Installations influencing the operation. (Appendix "J")
      a. SARDINIA.
           Installations in SARDINIA appear to be adequate with the 
possible exception of the ports, whose total theoretical 
capacity is insufficient for the initial phases of the opera-
tion. There are four usable ports (CAGLIARI being by far the 
most important), all well connected to the main rail and road 
nets. (Appendix "K" omitted). The railroad net, although not 
extensive, runs through the center of the island and connects 
the principal towns. (Appendix "L" omitted). The road net is 
very good, with three main north and south roads all connected 
with CAGLIARI; and three east and west roads, one at each end 
and one in the center of the island.(Appendix "M" omitted). 
There are certainly nine, and possibly as many as eighteen
 
 
 
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