airfields, with three of major importance (Appendix "N" omit-
ted), the Allied use of which would extend effective bomber 
operations to extreme SOUTHERN GERMAN and the DALMATIAN COAST 
(Appendix "Q"). There are adequate telephone and telegraph 
lines, and a few low power radio stations (Appendix "O"  -
omitted).
 
b. SICILY.
 
           Allowing for the minimum maintenance requirements for 
the force occupying SICILY, it is estimated that a maximum of 
30,000 troops (one division plus supporting arms) could be 
mounted from Sicilian ports (Appendix "K" - omitted). How-
ever, due to the inevitable dislocation of facilities in 
SICILY immediately following its occupation, the comparative 
proximity of Sicilian ports to AXIS air bases in ITALY, and 
the greater distance from SICILY to the west coast of 
SARDINIA, it is considered undesirable to mount any part of 
the Sardinian expedition from SICILY.
 
          Should it be decided to use one or more of the experi-
enced divisions which have taken part in the capture of 
SICILY, it would be preferable to transfer those units back 
to NORTH AFRICA, and to mount the whole expedition from 
there. Such return movements could be combined with the 
necessary amphibious training or rehearsal.
 
    c. NORTH AFRICA.
 
          Allowing for the minimum maintenance requirements for 
the permanent garrison in NORTH AFRICA, and assuming that 
all troops east of TUNISIA are maintained from the MIDDLE 
EAST, there is sufficient port capacity to mount the whole 
Sardinian expedition from North African ports, providing that 
CASABLANCA and other ATLANTIC ports are used (Appendix "K" 
omitted).
 
16. Advisability of the contemplated operation.
 
     a. Advantages.
 
        (1) The operation continues the engagement of AXIS land
 
 
 
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