disproportionate amount of Allied resources for the results 
obtained.
 
       (3) The operation further disperses Allied effort at the 
expense of the build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM for a cross-
channel operation.
 
       (4) The operation will be expensive in personnel, equip-
ment, and shipping due to the probably enemy concentration on 
the limited port facilities and landing beaches available.
 
       (5) The operation involves a commitment either to:
 
          (a) Neutralize CORSICA by air action, and accept some 
degree of interference 'with the use of SARDINIA as an 
offensive air base; or
            (b) To undertake further amphibious operations to 
occupy CORSICA, and thus obtain full and free use of 
SARDINIA as an air base.
 
        c. Conclusion.
 
               Since SICILY is the primary strategic prize of the area, 
the gain resuiting from the subsequent occupation of SARDINIA 
is not commensurate with the cost of the operation and the 
commitment of a permanent garrison, unless future operations 
against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY are envisaged.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 - 13 -