and air forces in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN area.
       (2) If not already accomplished by the seizure of
SICILY, the operation will probably result:
            (a) In ITALY withdrawing all of its forces from
       RUSSIA and the BALKANS for the defense of ITALY proper; 
       or
            (b) In GERMANY being forced to divert substantial 
       strength to ITALY to augment the Italian defenses.
       Either course will cause a drain on the available 
       German reserves.
       (3) Italian morale will be further lowered and ITALY may 
conceivably sue for a separate peace; encouragement will be 
given to Balkan countries to resist AXIS occupation. The 
resultant unrest and insurrection will require an increase 
in the garrisons in the area.
       (4) The UNITED NATIONS will obtain centrally-placed air 
bases suitable for bombing ITALY, particularly the northern 
industrial area, and the industrial area of SOUTHERN GERMANY.
       (5) The lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN 
will be further improved with resultant decreases in ship-
ping losses.
       (6) Provides an essential protective base for future am-
phibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE; and thereby 
forces GERMANY to reinforce her northern MEDITERRANEAN 
defenses to counter the threat. 
    b. Disadvantages.
      (1) This operation will require the maintenance of a 
large static garrison in SARDINIA; contrarily, if the opera-
tion were not undertaken, the AXIS garrison of SARDINIA 
would be immobilized by the mere threat of attack.
      (2) The operation would only slightly improve the Allied
position over that which obtains after NORTH AFRICA and 
SICILY have been consolidated, and in so doing absorbs a
 
 
                              - 12 -
 
DECLASSIi
\ JCS memo, 1-B~ EHP~ NLR,