APPENDIX "B"
 
                                                 CORSICA
 
         PART I - APPRECIATION OF A CORSICAN OPERATION
 
                                                PROBLEM
 
    17. To determine what action should be taken against CORSICA 
in connection with the capture of SARDINIA.
 
                                              DISCUSSION
 
    18. With the fall of both SARDINIA and. SICILY, GERMANY faces 
one of two conditions:
 
          a. ITALY is weakened, but still an active power. The 
threat to ITALY proper is acute. GERMANY cannot permit with-
drawal of Italian forces in the BALKANS and RUSSIA. GERMANY, 
therefore, must bolster the defenses of the Italian mainland.
The flow, if any, of troops would, therefore, be from CORSICA 
to ITALY. This condition is the more probable.
 
          b. ITALY is to all intents and purposes out of the war. 
Italian forces in the BALKANS and RUSSIA have lost all value 
for use other than defense of ITALY proper. GERMANY has been 
forced to replace these troops with those of other AXIS 
countries. GERMANY cannot then spare the troops required to 
defend ITALY effectively, and at most expects to fight a 
delaying action up the Italian Peninsula. However, the 
Allied threat to GERMANY is not across the ALPS from ITALY, 
but through SOUTHERN FRANCE. This threat can be most econom-
ically neutralized by the basing of the largest possible air 
force on C0RSICA, and the garrisoning of the island with the 
minimum number of ground troops to effectively defend the 
island as an air base. This action is relatively cheap in-
surance against an Allied entry to the continent via Southern 
France. It is estimated that the probable force GERMANY could 
provide in this case in CORSICA is one division and 100 - 150
aircraft.
 
 
 
                                                 - 15 -
 
DEC
 
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