19. The positive value of CORSICA to the UNITED NATIONS is 
small once SICILY and SARDINIA have been occupied, unless further 
amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY 
are envisaged. In this case seizure of CORSICA would, of course, 
be essential in order to protect the lines of communication.
 
    20. The negative value of CORSICA resulting from denial to 
ITALY could be considerable, however, if full use is to be made 
of SARDINIA as an advanced air base for a heavy bombing offensive 
of the industrial areas in NORTERN ITALY. Neutralization by 
air from SARDINIA of Italian airfields in CORISCA is no more 
likely to be permanently successful than AXIS efforts to neutral-
ize MALTA from SICILY, and the only sound alternative is denial 
of airfields by occupation of CORSICA. Four hundred and eighty 
AXIS aircraft based on CORSICA (estimated capacity of potential 
airdromes) would require the bulk of UNITED NATIONS air forces 
on SARDINIA to be defensive, but could not prevent the use of 
SARDINIA for forward airdromes, nor to a limited extent for an 
offensive bomber base. The probable maximum of 150 German air-
craft would not seriously interfere with Allied use of SARDINIA.
 
    21. Possession of CORSICA will have no appreciable effect on 
the security of the West-East MEDITERRANEAN SEA route once 
SICILY sad SARDINIA are in our hands.
 
    22. Failure of the UNITED NATIONS to occupy CORSICA will 
reveal to GERMANY that no surface action against SOUTHERN FRANCE 
or NORTHERN ITALY is tobe initiated; conversely, occupation of 
CORSICA will immediately force GERMANY to strengthen her NORTHERN
MEDITERRANEAN defenses
 
                                   CONCLUSIONS
 
    23. The immediate strategic value of CORSICA to the UNITED 
NATIONS lies in the denial of its use by the AXIS to interfere
 
                                                                                          Appendix "B"
 
 
                                               - 16 -