with Use of SARDINIA as an air base for bomber offensive against 
NORTHERN ITALY, and in creating an immediate threat against 
SOUTHERN FRANCE and NORTHERN ITALY.
 
    24. Limited use of SARDINIA as an Allied air base cannot be 
prevented by AXIS troops on CORSICA.
 
    25. The probable size of the AXIS garrison on CORSICA would not 
permit serious interference with Allied use of SARDINIA as an air base.
 
    26. Seizure of CORSICA is warranted only if GERMANY intends to 
reinforce CORSICA heavily in air forces, and then only if un-
hindered use of SARDINIA is deemed essential to the UNITED NATIONS. 
CORSICA must be occupied prior to an amphibious operation against 
SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY.
 
    27. Seizure of CORSICA should not be attempted as a preliminary 
or simultaneous operation to the capture of SARDINIA, as it will 
divert considerable strength from the main objective and adequate 
temporary neutralization can be achieved more cheaply by air 
action alone.
 
    28. Any assault on CORSICA should be made as soon after the 
fall of Sardinia, as possible, before any further reinforcement 
of the garrison.
 
    29. The Commander of the SARDINIAN expedition should be pre-
pared to occupy CORSICA immediately subsequent to the termination 
of the Sardinian operation, utilizing the same forces and shipping 
used against SARDINIA. This operation should be initiated only if 
it becomes evident that CORSICA is to be appreciably reinforced, 
and only if at that time full use of SARDINIA as an air base is 
deemed essential or if future amphibious Operations against
SOUTHERN FRANCE are contemplated.
 
 
 
                                                                    Appendix "B"
 
                                                 - 17 -