14. Installations and conditions influencing the operation.
      a. Port capacities.
               The port capacities in the DODECANESE are unknown but 
are certain to be inadequate. The only port of any importance 
is RHODES. The total capacity of the ports in CRETE is 3400 
tons per day. Of this total, the assault should gain two 
or three ports with a probable combined capacity of 750 
tons per day. In each case therefore it is clear that a 
large portion of the supplies and personnel must be landed 
over the beaches.
 
     b. Beaches.
               For both the DODECANESE and CRETE the landing beaches 
appear to be sufficient for the operation as planned.
 
     c. Coast defenses.
               In the case of RHODES and SCARPANT0, there are numerous 
coast defense guns dominating all approaches to the islands. 
Exact data is not available for CRETE but it is reasonable 
to assume that all landing beaches are heavily protected by 
Coast defense installations.
 
     d. Airfields.
               In the DODECANESE there are three airdromes on RHODES, 
and one each on SCARPANTO, KOS, LEROS, and SAMOS. On CRETE 
there are eight airdromes and at least nine well dispersed 
fighter strips. So far as landing fields and installations 
are concerned, the AXIS can operate a strong defensive air 
force from both the DODECANESE and CRETE.
 
     e. Anti-aircraft defenses.
               In the DODECANESE it is assumed, and in CRETE it is 
known, that there is Ample anti-aircraft defense for the 
airdromes.
 
     f. Railroads.
     There are no railroads either on the DODECANESE or on
CRETE.
 
 
 
 
                                             - 10 -