(3) Maintenance, monthly:
     6 AP and 34 AK.
 
             The basis for the computations and the effect of 
   port capacities are discussed in Appendix "F" - (omitted). 
 
   c. Availability.
       HUSKY requires shipping to lift 8 assault divisions 
whereas this operation requires the lift of four assault 
divisions, one or two of which may be shore to shore. There-
fore, assuming that losses in HUSKY do not exceed 50%, there 
will be adequate shipping in the area for the operation. A 
small amount of replacement shipping becomes available mean-
while.
 
13. Installations influencing the operation (Appendix "G" -
      omitted, except charts, Annexes "A" and "C" to Appendix "G").
 
     a. Air facilities.
               There are ll airdromes, 2 seaplane bases, and I landing 
field in the Heel, with a saturation point of 450 aircraft 
normally, 700 in emergencies.
 
     b. Beaches.
               Beaches suitable for landing exist near TARANTO and 
GALLIPOLI. The TARANTO beach is 15 miles long; the two at 
GALLIPOLI total three miles. Approaches and exits are adequate.
 
     c. Ports.
               The estimated total port capacity of the Heel (7850 DW 
tons Lper day) is ample to maintain the occupying force.
 
     d. Roads and railroads.
 
                Adequate road and railroad systems are in the area for 
the operation. They are unusually vulnerable to air attack 
and sabotage because of the numerous bridges and tunnels.
 
     e. Water supply.
                 Water supply for the entire area is primarily dependent 
on the easily destroyed Apulian aqueduct from the north. The 
occupying force must be prepared to import sufficient water to 
meet not only its own needs, but also those of the local
populace.                                             
 
                                              - 9 -