and munitions to these troops over such a limited route is
 much more difficult than for the Japanese with their better
 developed routes from southern BURMA. This course of action
 is rejected.
 
12. Analysis of Plan B (N. BURMA-AKYAB-RAMREE-ANDAMANS)
 
    To the operations for Plan A is added the capture of the
 ANDAMANS. If this added operation is Successful, it would provide
 an air and sea base for operations against Japanese shipping in
 the BAY OF BENGAL. The limited air and naval facilities to be
 secured, difficulties in their expansion, and vulnerability to
 attack from numerous Japanese air bases do not warrant assuming
 the cost of the operation. The logistical difficulties of the
 north BURMA operations in getting supplies to CHINA was discussed
 in Plan A. This course of action is rejected.
 
13. Analysis of Plan C (N. BURMA-ARAKAN-BASSEIN)
 
a. Concept of  the operation (See Map, Appendix "A")
 
(1) Phase I. (1 November 1943).
 
       (a) Advance into UPPER BURMA as in Plan A.
 
       (b) Capture AKYAB and RAMREE ISLAND as in Plan A.
 
(2) Phase II.
      (a) Simultaneous amphibious assault (1 December 1943)
  on:
 
1. SANDOWAY and GWA with the object of capturing
airfields.
 
2. The coast opposite BASSEIN to open way for
 overland advance to capture BASSEIN and airfields in
the area.         
      (b) Secure BASSEIN RIVER for logistic support through
BASSEIN.
 
(3) Throughout both phases:
 
     (a) Carry out an air offensive in BURMA.
 
     (b) Conduct naval operations in the PACIFIC to hold
 
the Japanese Fleet in those waters.