b. Degree of meeting required objectives (Paragraph 9)
 
          This operation will engage Japanese forces in lower 
BURMA as well as in north BURMA, establish an air base system 
in lower BURMA for a vigorous air offensive, and secure a 
lodgement at BASSEIN, second largest Burmese port, from which 
exploitation aimed at control of the IRRAWADY may be con-
tinued in the succeeding dry season. While this course of 
action would maintain pressure on the Japanese and retain 
the initiative, especially through air action, the provision 
of supplies to CHINA would be limited to the capacity of the 
route through INDIA and north BURMA. The large additional 
capacity of the routes from RANGOON could be made available 
by the capture of RANGOON and the opening of the IRRAWADY 
in the succeeding dry season campaign.
 
      c. A thorough examination indicates that the requirements 
of this operation in air, ground, and naval forces, aircraft, 
assault shipping, and landing craft, and ports and port 
facilities can be met provided prompt and decisive action is 
taken. Comments on the feasibility of this operation follow:
          (1) Chances of success of the Chinese advance from 
YUNNAN will be increased if the Chinese are convinced that 
the UNITED NATIONS intend to carry out an effective 
campaign and if logistic support is adequate.
            (2) The AKYAB assault can be supported by aircraft based 
on CHITTAGONG and COX'S BAZAAR. The RAMREE assault must 
be supported by carrier-based aircraft.
            (3) The UNITED NATIONS air offensive will seriously 
interfere with Japanese counter operations in north 
BURMA and the ARAKAN region, especially because of the 
vulnerability of the railroad, river, and two primary roads 
which are the main supply routes from RANGOON north.
            (4) The vulnerability of the ARAKAN assault to Japanese 
air attack will be offset in great measure by the 
preliminary action of our superior air force, the provision
 
 
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