of two carriers at each landing, and shore based support 
    from bases (if established in time) at AKYAB and on 
    RAMREE ISLAND.
               (5) Logistic support of'the ARAKAN airfields will be 
    difficult, but not insurmountable. The port of BASSEIN 
    will be of great assistance especially after control of 
    the BASBEIN RIVER is obtained.
            (6) The UNITED NATIONS can afford to risk the heavy 
    materiel and personnel losses to be expected. Early 
    provision for combating and controlling malaria must be 
    maded. 
    
    d. This course of action is accepted.
 
  14. Analysis of Plan D (N. BURMA-ARAKAN-IRAWADDY-BHAM0)
        A careful analysis of the forces required for this opera-
tion indicates that they cannot be furnished prior to the 1943 
dry season. This plan is therefore rejected.
 
  15. Details of the accepted plan (Plan C - N. BURMA-ARAKAN-
        BASSEIN)
        a. Concept of the operation
            See paragraph 13 a, and map, Appendix "A".
        b. Japanese forces
            (1) Ground and air forces
                The Japanese ground forces occupying BURMA total 4
infantry divisions, 1 armored regiment, and approximately 
132 fighters, 132 bombers, and 36 observation type planes. 
The 33d Division, with its headquarters at MANDALAY, con-
trols the CHINDWIN RIVER valley. The 56th Division, with 
its headquarters at LASHIO, is disposed along the BURMA-
CHINA border. The 55th Division, with its headquarters at 
AKYAB, is now in contact with British forces in the 
vicinity of MAUNGDAW and BUTHIDAUNG. The 18th Division, 
with its headquarters at MANDALAY, is deployed as follows:
 
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