DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974
 
 
       STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION
                                OF THE TOE OF ITALY
 
                    Report by Joint War Plans Committee
 
     1. A strategic analysis to determine the merits and possibili-
ties of an operation, subsequent to HUSKY, to seize the Toe of 
ITALY with the forces then available is contained in Enclosure "A."
 
     2. The concept of the operation (See chart, Appendix "A" to 
Enclosure "A") is briefly stated below:
        a. After preliminary air bombardment, to assault and seize 
    bridgeheads and airfields in the Gulfs of S. EUFEMIA and SQUIL-
    LACE AREAS by means of amphibious operations and air-borne 
    troops.
 
        b. Extend the bridgeheads and organize defensive positions 
    along the line PAOLA-ACRI-ROSSANO and destroy the enemy to 
    the south of this line.
 
     3. Major forces required.
         a. Ground.
             6 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armored Division, 1 Airborne 
    Division, 1 Motorized Division, 1 Parachute Brigade.
 
         b. Air.
             6 Fighter Groups, 8 Bomber Groups, 6 Troop Carrier 
    Groups, and 1 Observation Group.
 
         c. Naval Forces.            
            As required by the existing situation.
 
         d. Availability of forces.
            Unless removed for use elsewhere, forces will be available after HUSKY.
 
    4. Conclusions.
        This course of action is rejected. By comparison with other 
limited operations (DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or SARDINIA and 
CORSICA), this course of action can not be supported, and the 
conclusions of J.C.S. 293, "Limited 0perations in the Mediter-
ranean 1943-44," are reaffirmed. (These conclusions can be found 
in paragraph 10 of Enclosure "A.")
 
 
 
 
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