recalled quickly by rail. Considerable time would be required for the return of other Italian troops in the BALKANS, and since other AXIS troops would be required to replace them, it is doubtful if GERMANY would permit this. f. The estimate of AXIS air forces in the MEDITERRANEAN, after HUSKY, is that 1800-2000 aircraft may be available to oppose an operation against the Toe of ITALY. Italian ability to replace air losses will be practically nil, but GERMANY will have had time to replace most of her fighter losses and some of the bomber losses. German intent to main- tain this maximum air force in ITALY will depend upon her pressing need in other theaters and her final decision with regard to the defense of ITALY. g. Naval oppositionswill be difficult to estimate. It is assumed that the Italian surface forces will have withdrawn to northernbases as far sway from air attack as possible and may be divided between the ADRIATIC and the western MEDITER- RANEAN. The submarine force will probably remain an effec- tively contending force. The will to fight of the Italian Navy will be reduced.and its action will largely depend on German pressure. The "E" boat forces will have been committed against HUSKY, and those remaining will probably be based beyond radius of their effective use against our operations to seize the Toe. 8. General concept of operations. (See chart, Appendix "A") PHASE I. An air offensive from SICILY and TUNISIA to: (a) neutralize naval opposition and all airdromes south of the GULF OF SALERNO - GULF OF TARANTO line, (b) interrupt rail and road communications to the Toe of ITALY, and (c) punish troop concentrations and defense installations in the MERIDIONALE area (CATANZARO, NICASTE0, COSENZA, and CATEONE). Diversionary air operations over widespread areas. Commando raids along the TYRENIAN and IONIAN SEA coasts. Psychological and propaganda warfare. -4- |