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    recalled quickly by rail. Considerable time would be required 
    for the return of other Italian troops in the BALKANS, and 
    since other AXIS troops would be required to replace them, it 
    is doubtful if GERMANY would permit this.
 
       f. The estimate of AXIS air forces in the MEDITERRANEAN, 
    after HUSKY, is that 1800-2000 aircraft may be available to 
    oppose an operation against the Toe of ITALY. Italian 
    ability to replace air losses will be practically nil, but 
    GERMANY will have had time to replace most of her fighter
    losses and some of the bomber losses. German intent to main-
    tain this maximum air force in ITALY will depend upon her 
    pressing need in other theaters and her final decision with 
    regard to the defense of ITALY.
 
       g. Naval oppositionswill be difficult to estimate. It is 
    assumed that the Italian surface forces will have withdrawn 
    to northernbases as far sway from air attack as possible and 
    may be divided between the ADRIATIC and the western MEDITER-
    RANEAN. The submarine force will probably remain an effec-
    tively contending force. The will to fight of the Italian 
    Navy will be reduced.and its action will largely depend on 
    German pressure. The "E" boat forces will have been committed 
    against HUSKY, and those remaining will probably be based 
    beyond radius of their effective use against our operations 
    to seize the Toe.
 
8. General concept of operations. (See chart, Appendix "A") 
    PHASE I. An air offensive from SICILY and TUNISIA to:
    (a) neutralize naval opposition and all airdromes south of the
    GULF OF SALERNO - GULF OF TARANTO line, 
    (b) interrupt rail and road communications to the Toe of ITALY, 
    and 
    (c) punish troop concentrations and defense installations in the 
    MERIDIONALE area (CATANZARO, NICASTE0, COSENZA, 
    and CATEONE). 
 
Diversionary air operations over widespread areas. Commando raids 
along the TYRENIAN and IONIAN SEA coasts. Psychological 
and propaganda warfare.
 
 
 
                                               -4-
 
 
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