recalled quickly by rail. Considerable time would be required
for the return of other Italian troops in the BALKANS, and
since other AXIS troops would be required to replace them, it
is doubtful if GERMANY would permit this.
f. The estimate of AXIS air forces in the MEDITERRANEAN,
after HUSKY, is that 1800-2000 aircraft may be available to
oppose an operation against the Toe of ITALY. Italian
ability to replace air losses will be practically nil, but
GERMANY will have had time to replace most of her fighter
losses and some of the bomber losses. German intent to main-
tain this maximum air force in ITALY will depend upon her
pressing need in other theaters and her final decision with
regard to the defense of ITALY.
g. Naval oppositionswill be difficult to estimate. It is
assumed that the Italian surface forces will have withdrawn
to northernbases as far sway from air attack as possible and
may be divided between the ADRIATIC and the western MEDITER-
RANEAN. The submarine force will probably remain an effec-
tively contending force. The will to fight of the Italian
Navy will be reduced.and its action will largely depend on
German pressure. The "E" boat forces will have been committed
against HUSKY, and those remaining will probably be based
beyond radius of their effective use against our operations
to seize the Toe.
8. General concept of operations. (See chart, Appendix "A")
PHASE I. An air offensive from SICILY and TUNISIA to:
(a) neutralize naval opposition and all airdromes south of the
GULF OF SALERNO - GULF OF TARANTO line,
(b) interrupt rail and road communications to the Toe of ITALY,
and
(c) punish troop concentrations and defense installations in the
MERIDIONALE area (CATANZARO, NICASTE0, COSENZA,
and CATEONE).
Diversionary air operations over widespread areas. Commando raids
along the TYRENIAN and IONIAN SEA coasts. Psychological
and propaganda warfare.
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