General strategic considerations.
    lO. The advisability of an operation against the Toe of ITALY, 
Following HUSKY, must be assessed with respect to the over-all 
MEDITERRANEAN picture For 1943-44.  J.C.S. 288, "Invasion of 
the European Continent from Bases in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44"; 
concludes that the ultimate decisive invasion of the Continent 
should not be made From the MEDITERRANEAN region. J.C.S. 293, 
"Limited Operations in the Mediterranean in 1943-44",concludes that:
 
       "a. Although the timing aspect is most discouraging, opera-
tions against the Heel of ITALY are most likely to compel the 
dispersion of AXIS forces and to divert Forces from the 
Russian Front.
 
       "b. Operations against the DODECANESE are most likely 
to induce TURKEY to enter the war as an ally.
 
       "c. Being of moderate size, and, in general, the least 
objectionable operation strategically speaking, operations 
against SARDINIA and CORSICA will be the most acceptable 
if political pressure impels "doing something" during the 
period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.
 
       "d. Operations against the Heel of' ITALY would best satisfy 
a situation whereby a limited-scale operation might force 
ITALY out of the war.
 
       "e. The decision as to which of the three acceptable opera-
tions (Heel of ITALY, DODECANESE, SARDINIA and CORSICA), if 
any, will be conducted subsequent to a successful HUSKY, must 
be delayed as long as possible. This will permit more 
reliable assessment of the several motives that may impel 
additional operations in the MEDITERRANEAN."
 
ll. Operations against the Toe of ITALY were not considered in
J.C.S. 293. It is necessary, therefore, to determine by analysis
the acceptability of operations against the Toe, as compared to 
operations against the DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or SARDINIA and
CORSICA, for the specific purposes stated in the several conclu-
sions to J.C.S. 293, quoted above.
 
 
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