12. Toe vs. DODECANESE. It is evident that operations against 
the DODECANESE are more likely to induce TURKEY to enter the war 
as an ally than are operations against the Toe of ITALY.
 
    13. The problem then reduces itself to comparing the accepta-
bility of operations against the Toe of ITALY with operations against:
 
     a. The Heel of ITALY to:
         (1) Compel the dispersion of AXIS forces, and, if 
     possible, to divert AXIS forces from the Russian front, or
         (2) Take advantage of a situation whereby a limited-
     scale operation might force ITALY out of the war; and 
 
     b. SARDINIA and CORSICA, to satisfy political pressure 
    to "do something" during the period between a successful 
    HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.
 
    14. Toe vs. Heel.
 
          a. Assuming determined enemy resistance, operations against 
the Toe of ITALY are more likely to succeed than operations 
against the Heel, due to the fact that adequate land-based 
air support can be provided from Sicilian bases. The losses 
in the Heel operation might be excessive.. Either operation 
would continue the attrition of AXIS forces, especially air, 
and probably cause GERMANY to show her intention, or lack of 
intention, to keep ITALY in the war, by such Military opera-
tions as may be required. On the other hand, unless conducted 
as a preliminary to operations against the Heel, the seizure 
of the Toe of ITALY by the UNITED NATIONS would have little 
strategic significance. The forward range of our heavy 
bombers would not be increased materially by the seizure of 
the Toe; the Heel would place our Heavy Bombers within effec-
tive range of PLOESTI. Nor would the seizure of the Toe in 
any way increase our Post-HUSKY control of central MEDITER-
RANEAN waters, whereas the seizure of the Heel would yield the
 
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