objectionable operation strategically speaking, operations 
against SARDINIA and CORSICA will be the most acceptable." 
Although operations against the Toe were not considered in 
J.C.S. 293, the conclusion remains sound, because, under the 
conditions assumed:
 
        (1) The strategic advantages of seizing only the Toe of 
     ITALY are insignificant.
        (2) Such operations might develop into a long and 
     indecisive campaign of major proportions.
        (3) Seizure of the Toe followed by operations on the 
     Heel of ITALY would require forces in excess of those 
     available in the MEDITERRANEAN after HUSKY.
        (4) While avoiding the risks and undesirable possi-
     bilities inherent in any operations against the Italian 
     mainland, the seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA would 
     have  the added advantages of:
          (a) Increasing the security of the lines of com-
     munication through the western MEDITERRANEAN.         
          (b) Providing advanced air bases for bombing northern 
     ITALY and southern GERMANY.
 
16. Conclusions.
 
          The foregoing analysis finds, by comparison with other 
acceptable courses of action (DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or 
SARDINIA and CORSICA), that offensive operations by the UNITED 
NATIONS against the Toe of ITALY, following HUSKY, are not 
acceptable,and, therefore, should not be undertaken.
 
          The conclusions of J.C.S. 293, "LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44" (paragraph 10 above) remain sound.
 
 
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