GERMANY does not intend to hold ITALY by such Military action 
as may be required. In such circumstances, it can be assumed 
that the resistance of the Italian Military forces to our 
invasion will be of a low order. This would obviously
reduce immeasurably the hazards of conducting amphibious 
operations against the Heel. It follows, logically, that the 
choice would then rest between two feasible operations (Toe 
or Heel) both of which are within the 1943 capabilities of 
the UNITED NATIONS in the MEDITERRANEAN. It has been 
shown that possession of the Heel offers strategic advantages that 
far exceed those for the Toe. Therefore, under the circum- 
stances assumed -- a tottering ITALY -- operations against 
the Heel of ITALY (as compared to the Toe) would be the more 
acceptable.
 
15. Toe vs. SARDINIA and CORSICA.
 
      a. National and international pressure on the UNITED 
NATIONS political leadership may demand "doing something" 
against the European AXIS, in addition to the air bombardment 
offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM, during the extended period 
between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP. In this event, 
there are two separate circumstances in the MEDITERRANEAN 
area that might obtain: ITALY might or might not be on the 
verge of collapse or surrender.
 
      b. If she were on the verge of collapse, it was concluded 
above that UNITED NATIONS operations against the Heel of ITALY 
would be more acceptable than operations against the Toe. 
Under these circumstances, operations against SARDINIA and 
CORSICA should not be considered.
 
      c. If, however, following HUSKY, ITALY is not on the verge 
of collapse (or GERMANY has reinforced ITALY) and political 
pressure requires "doing something", J.C.S. 293, "LIMITED 
OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44," has con-
cluded that "being of moderate size and, in general, the least
 
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