PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL Summary 1. President's formula calls for unanimity in most cases. Unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the voting formula proposed by the President on December 5, 1944, would prevail in six categories of decisions having political and enforcement character. It would also prevail in the remaining category of decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, except when one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute. 2 Soviet proposal would increase domestic United States opposition. The proposed formula, or its basic principle, seems more clearly essential to us.now than heretofore. Our talks with members of Congress, and groups and individuals throughout the country, indicate that its abandonment would gravely alienate many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and would provide perfectionists and isolationlets with a powerful weapon against American participation in the Organization. It is furthermore disturbing that acceptance by us of the straight unanimity rule would be interpreted as surrender to Russia, whose rigid advocacy of that rule is widely known. 3. Soviet proposal is opposed by small nations. At the same time, our discussions with representa- tives of other American republics and United Nations have disclosed the strongest official opposition to the straight unanimity rule. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure popular sup- port for entrance into an international organization which, with such a rule, would bear every earmark of a great-power alliance. It appears that all of them would be bitterly disillusioned, that some may stay out, and that under such a rule various smaller nations after joining the organization may feel obliged to align them- selves with great powers, which would render the organi- zation undependable and unstable. |