THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL I To brine the problem into its proper perspective, the question of voting procedure in the Security Council must be considered in relation to the functions and powers to be assigned to the Council and, therefore, to the type of substantive decisions which the Council might be called upon to make. The various types of decisions are listed in the attached memorandum, in which they are grouped into seven categories. Under the voting formula proposed by the President, unanimity of the permanent members would always be re- quired for all categories of decisions except one: in those decisions involving promotion of peaceful settle- ment of disputes, a permanent member of the Council would not cast a vote if it is a party to the dispute in question. This exception is based upon the principle that the procedures involved under the excepted category would be quasi-judicial in character, and in such procedures no nation should be placed above the law in an organiza- tion based fundamentally on the principle of equality under the law. The rule of unanimity should always pre- vail under the other six categories of decisions because the procedures involved are of a political character and may require the use of force. In such procedures there is every justification for placing the permanent members in a special position since they must bear the principal responsibility for action in the maintenance of peace and security. While it is clear that, in general, the rule of unanimity of the permanent members is necessary, the proposed voting formula--or, at least, its basic prin- ciple--is essential from our point of view. It amply safeguards our basic national interests. Its abandon- ment would weaken rather than strengthen our position, both at home and abroad, and would cause us no end of trouble. Our talks with members of Congress and with many individuals and groups throughout the country clearly indicate |