-3-
 
     In somewhat further detail we had stated to the
British that we acknowledge that the Government whose 
military forces are operating in a given territory will 
in the ordinary course of events take the principal ini-
tiative in making decisions affecting that territory, 
due to the circumstances of the military operations therein.
We believe that the natural tendency for such initiatives 
to extend to other than military fields would be streng-
thened by the conclusion of an agreement of the type sug-
gested, and that the practical and military advantages 
sought in resorting to plans of this general nature do not 
counterbalance the evils inherent in such a system.
 
       The Department's views in opposition to the doctrine 
of spheres of influence, with particular reference to 
Great Britain and the USSR, is in full accord with the 
position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as set forth in 
Admiral Leahy's letter of May 16, 1944, the pertinent part 
of which is quoted as an attachment to this memorandum.
 
        The evolution of events in recent months indicates 
that the British and Soviet Governments are in fact operat-
ing under such an arrangement, as shown chiefly by the 
Soviet forbearance in Greece and the teamwork in Yugoslavia 
where the British seem to feel, however, that the odds are 
against them. In Albania, where, so far as we know, no ar-
rangement was made, the British have tried to keep a little 
ahead of the Russians. In Hungary the Russian military 
position has given the Soviet Government a predominant po-
sition, which the British have perforce had to accept. With 
only a somewhat precarious "lead" in Greece, the British 
may well feel that the scheme has neither divided in an 
equitable manner the areas of influence, nor protected the 
British position in the Mediterranean. This may account 
for the revival of British interest in a Balkan federation, 
which, if it includes Albania and Turkey, might limit to 
a certain degree the Slav power in the area which otherwise 
seems inevitably to reach toward Salonika and the Aegean 
coast line.
 
                              ANNEX