ANNEX EXCERPT FROM LETTER OF ADMIRAL LEAHY 
               May 16, 1944.
 
      "From the point of view of national and world-wide 
security, our basic national policy in post-war settle-
ments of this kind should seek to maintain the solidarity 
of the three great powers and in all other respects to 
establish conditions calculated to assure a long period 
of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements 
will be perfected for the prevention of future world con-
flicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy 
is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and 
revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths 
that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the 
war.
 
     "It would seem clear that there cannot be a world
war, or even a great war, which does not find one or 
more of the great military powers on each side. At the 
conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the 
foreseeable future, only three such powers -- the United 
States, Britain and Russia. Since it would seem in the 
highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia 
alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is 
apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable 
future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.  
 
       "In appraising possibilities of this nature, the 
outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal de-
velopment of the heretofore latent Russian military and 
economic strength-- a development which seems certain to 
prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military 
international relationships, and which has yet to reach 
the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In con-
trast,as regards Britain several developments have combined 
to lessen her relative military and economic strength 
and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer 
effective military opposition to Russia on the continent 
except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic 
coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the 
disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose 
upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far
too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side
of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors in-
volved -- resources, manpower, geography and particularly 
our ability to project our strength across the ocean and 
exert it decisively upon the continent -- we might be able 
to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under 
existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would
 
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